

DUALITY OF THE AFRICAN STATE AND SECURITY CHALLENGES

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Abstract

The big bang introduction of Westphalian models of statehood in Africa truncated the organic evolution of indigenous African governance structures into dominant structures for the African people. Despite the truncation, however, the traditional African state has continued to exist alongside the modern state. The resultant bifurcation has created a unique *duality of statehood* in which the traditional state runs parallel to the modern. This paper interrogates this phenomenon within the context of the continent's contemporary security burden. It argues, among others, that the duality of the African state splits the loyalty of citizens to the modern state and undermines the ability to harness citizen support for crime prevention and nation building and has also presented an interaction of factors that facilitate the politicisation of ethnicity with enormous security consequences.

Keywords: Africa; Statehood; Duality; Security challenges.

1. Introduction

Unlike European states, which emerged organically after several centuries of evolution, African states emerged as a product of colonial scramble for resources on the continent. As such, even though various sophisticated indigenous leadership and governance systems existed in the forms of kingdoms and tribal enclaves before the advent of colonisation, their organic evolution into African-bred states were truncated by the big-bang introduction of Westphalian models of states on the continent. The rise of modern states, however, only interrupted their eventual emergence as overarching indigenous governance structures at the macro-level for the African people, but did not obliterate their existence.

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Despite the rise and dominance of the modern state, therefore, the traditional structures have evolved alongside the modern state by maintaining their anthropologica¹ and tangible attributes that marked the pre-colonial existence of indigenous nations. In countries, such as Ghana, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, South Africa, Botswana and Zambia, therefore, there exist traditional institutions with strong primordial social appeal among citizens. The resultant bifurcation has left such states with *duality of statehood* in which the traditional states run parallel, in many ways, to the modern. Despite the primacy of the modern state, the enduring actuality of the existence of the traditional state cannot simply be wished away. Understanding this duality of the modern African has become necessary in light of the fact that several decades after independence, many countries on the continent continue to grapple with the nature of states inherited at independence and the resultant state-making processes.

This paper interrogates the phenomenon of duality of statehood within the context of the continent's contemporary security burden. Exploring the nature of the interactions between an enduring traditional African "state" and the challenges of a modern state is an exercise that is capable of enlightening both the discourse on the quest for solutions to the insecurity threats on the continent as well as our understanding of the interactions between culture and political dynamics in state creation in the Third World. This attempt is in line with an argument advanced by Ayoob (1992: 64) and Jackson (2002: 38) that since state-making is a primary concern for political elites in the Third World, it must be central to any paradigm constructed to explain the internal and external behaviour of states in that part of the World.

The paper advances two sets of inter-related arguments in relation to the cause-effect relationships surrounding state vulnerability to contemporary insecurity. First, that duality of the African state splits the loyalty of citizens to the modern state and undermines the ability to harness citizen support for crime prevention and nation building. The second argument is that the existence of resilient traditional states in weak modern states sometimes present enormous security challenges originating from the politicisation of ethnicity or the *ethnicisation* of politics.

The paper is divided into four main sections. The first section details the origins and nature of the duality of states in Africa by situating the concept within the history of state creation in Africa. The two subsequent sections then discuss duality in the context of citizen loyalty, strong societies and horizontal legitimacy, respectively, before concluding.

2. The origins and nature of duality of statehood in Africa

Before the advent of colonialism, kingdoms and tribal enclaves existed in Africa with sophisticated systems of leadership, governance and social contract between leaders and the led. According to Ayittey (2006: 72–85), the various forms of systems at the time

constituted two types of pre-colonial states. Those that were stateless and acephalous, and those with centralised authorities. The latter were ruled by kings and chiefs, and had administrative, security and judicial structures. Examples of the former included the Igbo of Nigeria, the Kung of Liberia, the Talensi of Ghana, the Somalis, Jie of Uganda and Mbeere of Kenya. In the Ghana, for instance, kingdoms such as the Asante, Gonja and Dagbon existed with sophisticated centralised traditional political institutions with established arms of “government,” army and trading ties with other kingdoms. So, did the Benin Kingdom in Nigeria, the Lula and Kuba in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Buganda in Uganda, the Twana of Botswana, the Igbos of Nigeria, and the Tongas in Zambia. In both types of “statehood,” the welfare of the people was the core functions of the state and, there were checks and balances against excesses.

The evolution of such indigenous states were, however, cut short by the onset of colonisers whose territories of operations were based on arbitrary balkanisation of the continent at the Berlin conference of 1844-1845² without regard for existing pre-colonial indigenous functional “states.” Instead, it was based on resource and territory allocation among European powers. Consequently, territories administered by colonial representatives did not conform to indigenous identities and states. People of different indigenous identities ended up in the same territories or were split into different colonial states. This “big bang” approach to the creation of colonial states on the continent effectively dismembered existing identities and forcibly constructed new ones through the creation of Westphalia models of states out of them. Whilst belonging to the same territories, the majority of societies in colonies did not succeed in creating collective identities out of the disparate groups of people within those boundaries. The resultant colonised African entities, which formed the basis for the emergence of the modern African state, were essentially elitist, extractive rather than productive, and concentrated authority at the centre. It was created and sustained by force and made use of indirect rule through chiefs and warrant chiefs, in some cases, as means of securing law and order. The use of chiefs and the endorsement of particular ethnicities, nurtured hatred among the people of the disparate indigenous pre-colonial nations. The legitimacy of the colonial state did not hinge on attachment and connection of the people, but the recognition and approval from imperial capitals.

At the dawn of independence colonies were granted independence as was. This was endorsed by the Organisation of African Unity’s (OAU) adoption of the inviolability of territories inherited from the colonial powers within the context of the legal principle of *uti possidetis* and under international pressure for the borders to be left alone (Deng and Lyons, 1998: 73). Many post-independence African leaders also preserved colonial boundaries so as to secure their political survival and wealth (Clapham, 1996: 4-6). Consequently, apart from Eritrea and South Sudan, no other successionist tendencies from populations disgruntled about the nature of states inherited at independence on the continent has succeeded in altering the colonial boundaries.

As a result of throwing together established kingdoms into the modern state, many African states have ended up not only as a modern state, but one that exists alongside and runs parallel to strong traditional institutions. As argued by Azarya and Chazan (1987: 109-110), this is traceable to the basic duality that was inherent in colonial rule in which there existed “a European administrative policy, only partly opened to a small indigenous elite, and a heterogeneous society still organised around various traditional structures and maintaining tenuous ties with alien central political institution.” This made the resultant modern state a prototype of a minimal state that touched only intermittently the lives of those within its boundaries but housed various strong traditional state formations. At independence, the alien central political institution and the territories they controlled became the modern state. The traditional structures were not dismantled nor effectively incorporated into the alien core, now the state. Consequently, the two entities exist side-by-side each other and the tenuous ties that once existed between them persists. This has resulted in a bifurcation of some African states, herein conceptualised as duality of statehood.

Despite the multiple conceptualisations of the state, statehood as used in this paper in relation to the traditional state structures draws on their empirical attributes as provided for by international law which defines a state as a “territorially bound sovereign entity” which possesses (a) permanent population, (b) a defined territory, (c) government and (d) is capable of entering into relations with other states (Ranney, 1987: 35-36; Danziger, 2011: 115-130). The four attributes are derived from Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States.³ A related legal perspective defines the state “as a community consisting of a territory and a population subject to organised political authority and characterised by sovereignty” or a legal person recognised by international law with the above attributes (Shaw, 2008: 198-264). The paper also makes use of Jackson and Rosberg’s (1982: 1-24) conceptualisation of empirical and juridical states. Despite their empirical attributes, however, traditional states are empirically not states because they are not recognised as such by members of the international system even though recent developments point to an increasing recognition of the existence of traditional structures and their importance in addressing certain weaknesses of the state in parts of Africa.⁴ Their *de facto* rather than *de jure* existence, and impact of their interaction with the juridical modern state is therefore the defining context within which the concept of duality of statehood as outline in this paper is situated.

African states with the duality phenomenon bear a number of distinct characteristics. First is duality of institutional systems. As Aning (2007: 209-210), succinctly observes:

[O]n the one hand there is a parliamentary and judicial/legal (modern) system together with all its accoutrements and relevant institutions including a police force, which have been inherited from the former colonial masters. This is the ‘official’ (modern) system that appears on the surface of things and increasingly perceived by the populace as alien and corrupt. But on the other hand, there is the ‘unofficial’ (traditional /cultural) system that operates beneath the surface.

As a result of this duality of systems, there is a divided loyalty of citizens nurtured by the dictates of natural social preferences and prioritisation between the modern state and the traditional “state.” The relative importance of each loyalty is a factor of the usefulness of the identity created out of it. Multiple identities have eventually emerged around the modern state and traditional structures. Owing to the fact that the importance and compatibility of these multiple identities differ at various times and circumstances, people employ conditional identities based on what suits the context and needs (Atta-Asamoah, 2012:11). The attachment of citizens to the modern state has consequently become a function of state relevance and usefulness to the daily lives of citizens. Due to the inability of the state to project usefulness by providing the requisite basic public goods and services, resort to the traditional structures as a means of social security by citizens has arisen. Citizen disengagement or divided loyalty has emerged largely because the context for loyalty between the state and traditional institutions are inversely related – *i.e.*, more relevance of the state implies less usefulness of traditional institutions in the daily lives of people and vice-versa.⁵ The consequence of this in relation to state-citizen relationship is multiple fold.

First, the state and existing traditional structures jostle for the attention and loyalty of citizens. Citizens, however, are more easily attached to the traditional structures because they constitute central part of ascribed identities inherited at birth. As part of ascribed or primordial identity markers, traditional structures and their correlate systems are deeply rooted in the socialisation of the individual and the cultural construct at the core of social networks. As a source of ascribed or primordial identity, attachment to traditional “nationality” or identity becomes unchangeable across time and space and also does not allow for attainment by all people. Traditional systems as source of identity are thus primarily exclusive. Despite being also a source of ascribed identity, attachments to identities resulting from belonging to the modern state is typically inclusive and allows for the inclusion of citizens of different traditional identities. Whereas members of different traditional identities can be citizens of a modern state, not all citizens of a state can belong to a given traditional “state.” The result is entrenched identity creation around exclusive and inclusive primordial identity markers and their associated socio-political challenges to the construction of nationhood.

The next characteristic is the duality of legal systems leading to split loyalty between the demands of the modern state for loyalty through legal frameworks vis-à-vis the moral dictates of the traditional “state” which seeks loyalty and enforce frameworks through traditional values and ethical concerns. Aning (2007:209–210) notes that this challenge is manifested through the existence of:

traditional systems of governance together with their traditional laws, often in the form of taboos, having various sanctions and systems of institutional support [...] Legally, only the first exists; the second is barely acknowledged. But realistically the first is embedded within the second. The way the first is interpreted in any given situation depends on its understanding vis-a-vis the traditional system. The power of the second system, of course, arises from the fact that it is embedded in the traditional values and ethical concerns of

the people, and its ultimate sanction lies in the unseen dimensions especially with the ancestors. One may be 'forced' to observe the first but one is morally obliged to observe the second.

The various characteristics manifest institutionally, legally and in the nature of loyalty of citizens. How do these dimensions relate to the insecurity dynamics and to what extent does duality of statehood predispose a country to insecurity? The subsequent sections will attempt to illustrate the nature of the interactions between the various dimensions in the creation of vulnerabilities to insecurity with various Africa cases.

3. Duality, loyalty and insecurity in Africa

The average state in Africa is a few decades old. This means that as much as some progress has been made in the preservation of their dominance in the monopoly over the use of force, they are still defined by certain fundamental challenges and weaknesses in projecting relevance to citizens and establishing presence across their territories. These weaknesses have meant that in many cases, the idea of the state is not yet a natural part of citizens. The main challenge of state making in this part of the world is therefore centred around constructing the idea of the state in the minds of citizens and getting them to accept its naturalness as a core part of their social, economic and political mobilisation. Yet, in most countries, despite commendable efforts and the dominance of the modern state over all social, cultural and political organisations, the state remains fundamentally weakened by the fact that the idea of the modern state is still under construction among citizens.

This is not only as a result of the challenges associated with the state-creation and formation process on the continent, but also the nature of the politics and political space in most countries, as well. The political space in many African countries is characterised by winner-takes-all politics, state capture by political and economic elites and competition for the centre of the state. In this mix, political strongmen have established and make use of extensive patronage networks through which their clientele sustain them at the top in exchange for inequitable share of national resources. Patronage networks have become entrenched channels for benefiting from the state and the maintenance of partnership between leaders and citizens.

The result is an inclusion-exclusion dichotomy surrounding access to national resources with few privileged people at the centre and millions of citizens at the periphery. The associated competition for the centre of the state has excluded the majority of citizens and worsened the divide between the haves at the top and have-nots at the base of the resultant relationship pyramid. The exploitative nature of political elites at the top of the pyramid has left the masses at the base with little conception of the relevance of the state. The state is at best regarded by the excluded majority as weak, remote, irrelevant and, at best of times, captured to serve the interest(s) of its political and economic elites and,

where necessary, their cronies and tribesmen. For the many who cannot seek inclusion through political participation, their awareness of the extent of systemic corruption, exploitation and dysfunctionality of the state has provided the basis for the erosion of legitimacy and subsequently their disengagement from the modern state. Many citizens do not believe anymore in the functionality of the state in the midst of the increasing weaknesses of state institutions and exploitative political environment.

Disengagement from the state has fostered self-helpism and resort to social and cultural structures, a domain where the traditional state dominates the modern state in relevance. In a 2005 survey conducted in South Africa by the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), citizens interviewed expressed higher levels of trust for traditional authority in most provinces of the country, particularly in the rural areas (ECA, 2007: 9-13). More than 50 per cent of respondents in rural areas trusted the traditional state more than the modern state. Even in the urban areas with higher levels of enlightened people, the trust for traditional state institutions were high in comparison to the modern state. Apart from the stunning indication of the existence of bifurcation in the South African context, it also establishes the inverse relationship between traditional and modern states suggesting that the more relevant one is in the daily lives of people, the less the need for the other is. In rural areas where the functional presence and relevance of the modern African state is minimal, the reliance on social structures anchored on the traditional state is high.

Resort to ethnic identities, either for social security or opportunities, divide citizens loyalty between the traditional and modern state, as the dominance of the former in the social sphere is given no resistance by the latter. The state in this context has ended up becoming one of the many organisations competing for social control, a competition that favours the traditional state. Whereas the idea of the modern state is challenged and, at best, still under construction, the idea of the traditional African state is internalised in citizens by culture and socialisation. The control of the traditional state in choices and behaviour construction is thus primary. State laws are thus usually appreciated through the prism of socially constructed behaviour and worldview.

In many African countries, this interaction between the modern state's weaknesses and the traditional state presence presents major challenges to law enforcement. In situations of split loyalty, citizen attachment to the implementation of law is weakened. In cases of low state presence in rural areas where effective state law enforcement is dependent on citizen cooperation in intelligence gathering and law enforcement, the lack of loyalty means that the state is not given any preference in situations of competing interests with the traditional state. The biggest challenge emerges in situations of conflicting criminalisation between the modern and traditional state. In most countries in Africa, the modern state's criminalisation of issues is drawn from modern laws, penal codes and are enforced by both the judiciary and law enforcement institutions through punitive measures including fines and jail terms. In the Akan parts of Ghana, for example, this constitutes "*abrɔfo amamre*" (white man's culture or law). The traditional state on the other hand, sometimes, does not directly criminalise but rather construct myths,

cultural requirements, ethics and taboos around issues with the principal aim to educate and discourage outlaws, which constitutes “*yɛn amamrɛ*” which literary means “our culture or laws.” What may be criminalised by the modern state might not necessarily be considered as such by the traditional state, even though the traditional state may not necessarily encourage it. In the past, the abuse of “*abrɔfo amamrɛ*” by the colonial state administration has given rise to the realisation of selective use of state laws and/or the politicisation of certain laws for the advancement of particular interest(s). In the colonial era, for example, locally brewed liquor (akpeteshie) was banned and brewing criminalised in the 1930s (Akyeampong, 1994). Among other reasons, the move was aimed at discouraging the use of the local brew to make way for their Western equivalents and the businesses of white settlers.

Not all criminalisation by the modern state find their way into traditional state ethnics and mythology. However, the inability of the modern state to make room for the criminalisation of the local state’s demands gives way to conflict between the freedoms of citizens and the taboos of traditional systems. A case in point is the ban on drumming and noise making in Accra. As the seat of the Ghanaian state, Accra is basically the part of the country with the most state presence. In an ideal case, the laws of the state should be the supreme provisions for defining freedoms and restrictions of citizens within the city. However, the Ga state’s attempt to impose and enforce a ban on drumming and noise making led to a conflict between cosmopolitan citizens who draw their freedoms from “*abrɔfo amamrɛ*” and the Ga state who demanded an enforcement of “*yɛn amamrɛ*” in the territory of the Ga state. Consequently, the volatile nature of the issue could only be solved when the modern state permitted the fulfilment of the demands of the traditional state in a cosmopolitan capital, housing the seat of the modern state.

In rural parts of Ghana, the traditional state is the most dominant, due to the absence of the modern state. Like most parts of Africa, the presence of the state is a factor of distance from the centre of the state. The further one moves away from the capital, the lesser the state presence is felt. Interviews with law enforcement officers in Ghana indicate that such places are the major hub for Cannabis production and supply to the urban areas of the country.⁶ This is not only because of the lack of state law enforcement presence and agricultural viability but also because of the permissiveness of the local communities and their willingness to shield Cannabis farmers. This can be blamed on the conflict of criminalisation and the permissiveness of the local structures of the traditional state, which is usually dominant in those areas. Cannabis production in Ghana is illegal as per the provisions of PNDC Law 236. The traditional state has no taboos against it. In the Akan areas of Ghana, its use is only discouraged by its characterisation as “*obonsam tawa*,” which means the devil’s tobacco. Interviews conducted among law enforcement officers in Ghana show that in communities such as Serkwa in the Brong Ahafo region and Apeisika, a farming community in the Kwahu East District of the Eastern Region of Ghana, the prevalence of Cannabis cultivation have made them major hubs for the drug production in the country. In a law enforcement swoop in February 2016, more than 214 bags of cannabis were confiscated within 2 hours of a search and seize operation

in Apeisika.⁷ Despite the prevalence and openness of the cultivation of Cannabis, the communities have succeeded in keeping a lid on the information from getting to state law enforcement officials. Such developments in the rural areas constitute the emergence of an insecurity enclave, in this case, *a criminal enclave* within a territory dominated by the traditional state but within which the breaking of the laws of the modern state persists due to lack of cooperation between the two.

The existence of such enclaves in turn has made it easy for organised criminal groups to find havens for recruitment, disguise, activity sanctuary and protection. In an interview with Richard Blankson, Deputy Executive Secretary of Ghana's Narcotics Control Board (NACOB), he observed that some drug barons in Ghana are even traditional leaders whose insertion into the society, social standing and influence make them practically untouchable.⁸ Another case is that of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) member of parliament, Eric Amoateng, who was incarcerated in the United States in 2005 for trafficking heroin valued at \$6 million (Amoateng & Adjei v USA, 2005). Whilst incarcerated, his community honoured him and consistently mobilised in his support both because he is a son of the Nkoranza area, a former traditional chief of Amoma in the Kintampo district, and his contribution to development in the area. According to a report by the Statesman newspaper some traditional leaders in the area enjoined others to emulate his good behaviour in the area despite the popularity of the former MP's criminal records. Such an explicit praise of a jailed criminal amounts to an endorsement of crime and encouraging young ones to follow his footsteps.

This paper argues that the mutually-reinforcing interaction between the weaknesses of the state, citizen disengagement and the resultant emergence of criminal enclaves within which criminality is legitimised and shielded, collectively define an important dimension of duality and insecurity in many African cases. The major intervening variable is the competition between the state and traditional structures for social control. In two of his seminal works: *Strong societies and weak states: state-society relations and state capabilities in the Third World* (1988) and *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another* (2001), Migal (1988: 4) notes, among other things, that states are required to have the "capacity to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources and use resources appropriately" in effort to survive and strengthen. Ultimately, the state is able to survive and strengthen by maintaining social control characterized by capacity, compliance, and participation by citizens as well as aligned survival strategies. In this context, the concurrent existence of resilient traditional states presents a number of challenges. First, it provides a rival to the modern state in the competition for the establishment and/or realization of the idea of the state and control of society. As such in the many cases of the weaknesses of the state and its inability to harness the loyalty of citizens, the existence of traditional states interested in competing for the social control of its people present a natural rival to the modern state. In some African counties, social control has become split between traditional kingdoms and the state.

In this case, the weaknesses of the state have facilitated the role of traditional state, however, the duality of the state means that the modern state faces an uphill task in penetrating the society and regulating social relationships among people who are already attached to their primordial institutional structures. This situation makes the state one of the many entities jostling for social control, rather than the primary or dominant actor managing social control. In countries, such as Ghana, institution of chieftaincy is guaranteed by the constitution and the institution maintains customary management of land. As rightly noted by Migdal (2001: 11), the state finds itself in a situation whereby the interactions between the “multiple sets of formal and informal guard posts for how to behave promoted by different groups” are principally conflicted.

4. Duality and intra-state conflicts

Perhaps the biggest and most destabilising link between the duality of statehood and insecurity stems from intra-state conflicts associated with traditional states. There is hardly an African country that is ethnically homogenous. Nigeria, for instance, has more than 300 ethnic groups, Kenya has 42, South Sudan, the continent’s newest state, has 64, among others with numerous ethnic compositions. This is by virtue of the bundling together of many pre-colonial nations into the modern state. The multiplicities of these ethnic groups reflect the existence of multiple nations within those states along which the multiple traditional states existing in those states are reflected. As such the duality of the state in these countries do not imply the existence of a single traditional state within the territories of a given modern state. The challenges associated with these are numerous. However, for the purposes of this analysis, I will discuss it at the level of the inter-traditional state relationships and the interactions between modern state politics and the traditional state.

Before the onset of colonialism, many of the traditional states had established strong relationships, trade and cultural exchange norms. Others had extreme adversarial relationships characterised by wars, retaliatory raids and conflicts. Having been thrown into the modern state space to co-exist means that whilst it is easy for those with good relationships to co-exist, the interactions between those that had a history of tension are bound to be strenuous because of age-old stereotypes and animosity. The latter group of traditional states have perpetuated tensions at the sub-national levels of states and in many cases become the catalysts for numerous inter-tribal wars ranging from Rwanda, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya and many others. In the independence years, these tensions originated from the actions of colonial powers who handed over political power to rival ethnic identities in countries like Rwanda. The subsequent tensions led to mass killings and genocide. In many African states, tensions still exist between tribes due to conflicts at the inter-traditional state level with phenomenal implications.

A bigger challenge exists at the level of the interactions between the many traditional states and politics in the modern state. This is principally in terms of either the politicisation of ethnicities as a mobilisation tool in the creation of political power bases or the *ethnification* of politics so as to serve the interests of particular ethnic patronage blocks. This has impact on the legitimacy of states, ethnic tensions and overall state stability. Political conflicts easily end up drawing tribal groups into them in a way that affects state stability, widens stakes in conflicts and increases the layers of complexity in conflict resolution. In South Sudan, for instance, a political conflict between President Salva Kiir and his former Vice President Riek Machar has ended up becoming a war between the Dinka and the Nuer people. This made the situation in the country immediately volatile and extremely complex because the problems between the two leaders in their contestation for place in the modern state has ended up becoming a trigger to age-old animosity and an inter-tribal conflict between their two traditional states. The overall impact is the destabilisation of the young modern state and a derailment of its state-making process.

At the level of traditional systems, politicisation has created enormous challenges for succession politics in certain traditional states. In parts of northern Ghana, for instance, political interferences and alignment of certain traditional structures with particular political parties has made it difficult for chieftaincy conflicts to be resolved. A typical example is the Ya-Na murder case in which the overlord of the Dagbon kingdom, Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II, was murdered in March 2002. Rather than a bipartisan approach to dealing with the conflict that ensued, the major political parties in the country rather sought to exploit the situation by blaming each other. To date, the politicised nature of the issue continues to define the security as well as the political orientation of many people in the Dagbon area of the Northern region. This has had dangerous repercussions on traditional succession politics in the Dagbon Kingdom and made it difficult for certain chieftaincy disputes to be addressed amicably in many parts of the country. The rise of chieftaincy conflicts originating from such issues end up as a state insecurity issue with enormous consequences.

Legally, holders of traditional offices in some countries, such as Ghana, are supposed to be apolitical.⁹ This is in recognition of the duality of the state and the challenges posed by it. However, the increasing politicisation of ethnic identities and interests has indirectly made traditional office holders unofficial stakeholders in the politics of many countries. This is because they are custodians of the welfare of their ethnic groups and are bound to be interested in the political successes and failures of their members. Holders of traditional leadership positions and their traditional state territories are impacted equally by the decisions and policies of the political leadership of the modern state and are thus obliged by circumstances to monitor their stakes in the modern state. Politically, this conflicting interaction has meant that in democracies, political elites have had to seek the endorsement of traditional leaders who are custodians of traditional states. This has led to aligning of some traditional states with certain political leanings, which sometimes lead to political interferences in the traditional states by political rivals.

The existence of traditional states has impacted secession politics as well as tensions between the structures of the modern state in some countries and towering traditional leaderships in countries in many parts of Africa. The posture of the Asante, Dagbon, Buganda and the Zulu, for instance, remain a constant feature in the stability of their respective countries to the extent that even their pronouncements have major national security implications. In 2015, for example, the Zulu King, Goodwill Zwelithini, blamed foreigners in South Africa for the country's worsening economic fortunes. The statement subsequently sparked nationwide protests and xenophobic attacks against foreigners, with major international repercussions for the South African state.

5. Conclusion

Duality in Africa is indicative of Africa's past of the truncation of indigenous statehood and its present challenges around the incompleteness of the state-building experience. Just as the state-making process remains an important paradigm for understanding the weaknesses of the African state, so is the reality of the duality that surrounds the modern and traditional states. The duality of the African state is an important entry point for understanding some of the weaknesses inherent in modern African states as well as the consequences of the endurance of traditional state structures despite modernity. The elements of the interaction between the modern and traditional states are directly linked to the weaknesses of the former and reflected in its state-making processes and insecurity dynamics. The key intervening variable is that the existence of the traditional state ultimately interferes with the monopoly of the state over social control. The inability of the modern state to remain the dominant actor pursuing the penetration, use and control of society hampers its ability to fully determine the trajectory of the many variables that define security in its territory. This has affected the idea of the state and ultimately provided important interactions that facilitate the emergence of negative ethnicity and certain social infrastructure within which insecurity threats survive and thrive.

Notes

1. The anthropological conception of the state suggests that a state exists when there are distinctive leadership roles, rules of social interaction, and a set of organisational arrangements to identify and serve the collective needs of people (Danziger ,2011: 115-130).
2. This conference was called by German chancellor Otto von Bismarck upon the request of Portugal and aimed at negotiating questions about the control of territories in Africa.
3. This was a Convention signed on 26 December 1933 by the seventh International Conference of American States at Montevideo, Uruguay. The Convention codifies the four attributes of statehood in international law.

4. The rise of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms exploiting the successes of the traditional state in conflict resolution in parts of Africa is an important indication of this. Some traditional institutions have also succeeded in leading developing initiatives in their territories.
5. It should be noted that in Africa people usually have multiple identities, the relative importance of the various identities and compatibility differs at various times and circumstances. People employ *conditional identities* based on what suits the context and needs. For detailed discussion, see Atta-Asamoah, A. 2012. *Overview paper on the management of diversity in Africa*. UN Special Office for Africa (UNOSA). Available: http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/reports/Diversity%20in%20Africa_final%20version.pdf.
6. Series of interviews and discussions with law enforcement officials and academics was conducted in Accra, Ghana, 17 February 2013.
7. See “Owners of 204 bags of ‘wee’ to be arraigned,” <http://citifmonline.com/2016/02/16/owners-of-204-bags-of-wee-to-be-arraigned-photos/>, accessed 02 November 2016.
8. Interview with Nii Lante Blankson, Deputy Executive Secretary of NACOB, Accra, 15 February 2013.
9. See for instance, the application of this to members of parliament in Chapter 10 (94) (c) of the 1992 constitution of Ghana. This section explicitly states that a chief cannot be an MP.

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